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Abstract
We develop a distributed second order optimization algorithm that is
communication-efficient as well as robust against Byzantine failures of the worker
machines. We propose COMRADE (COMunication-efficient and Robust Approxi-
mate Distributed nEwton), an iterative second order algorithm, where the worker
machines communicate only once per iteration with the center machine. This is
in sharp contrast with the state-of-the-art distributed second order algorithms like
GIANT [34] and DINGO[7], where the worker machines send (functions of) local
gradient and Hessian sequentially; thus ending up communicating twice with the
center machine per iteration. Moreover, we show that the worker machines can
further compress the local information before sending it to the center. In addition,
we employ a simple norm based thresholding rule to filter-out the Byzantine worker
machines. We establish the linear-quadratic rate of convergence of COMRADE
and establish that the communication savings and Byzantine resilience result in
only a small statistical error rate for arbitrary convex loss functions. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work that addresses the issue of Byzantine resilience
in second order distributed optimization. Furthermore, we validate our theoreti-
cal results with extensive experiments on synthetic and benchmark LIBSVM [5]
data-sets and demonstrate convergence guarantees.
1 Introduction
In modern data-intensive applications like image recognition, conversational AI and recommendation
systems, the size of training datasets has grown in such proportions that distributed computing have
become an integral part of machine learning. To this end, a fairly common distributed learning
framework, namely data parallelism, distributes the (huge) data-sets over multiple worker machines
to exploit the power of parallel computing. In many applications, such as Federated Learning
[20], data is stored in users’ personal devices and judicious exploitation of the on-device machine
intelligence can speed up computation. Usually, in a distributed learning framework, computation
(such as processing, training) happens in the worker machines and the local results are communicated
to a center machine (ex., a parameter server). The center machine updates the model parameters by
properly aggregating the local results.
Such distributed frameworks face the following two fundamental challenges: First, the parallelism
gains are often bottle-necked by the heavy communication overheads between worker and the center
machines. This issue is further exacerbated where large clusters of worker machines are used for
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modern deep learning applications using models with millions of parameters (NLP models, such as
BERT [10], may have well over 100 million parameters). Furthermore, in Federated Learning, this
uplink cost is tied to the user’s upload bandwidth. Second, the worker machines might be susceptible
to errors owing to data crashes, software or hardware bugs, stalled computation or even malicious
and co-ordinated attacks. This inherent unpredictable (and potentially adversarial) nature of worker
machines is typically modeled as Byzantine failures. As shown in [21], Byzantine behavior a single
worker machine can be fatal to the learning algorithm.
Both these challenges, communication efficiency and Byzantine-robustness, have been addressed in a
significant number of recent works, albeit mostly separately. For communication efficiency, several
recent works [32, 30, 2, 14, 1, 35, 19] use quantization or sparsification schemes to compress the
message sent by the worker machines to the center machine. An alternative, and perhaps more natural
way to reduce the communication cost (via reducing the number of iterations) is to use second order
optimization algorithms; which are known to converge much faster than their first order counterparts.
Indeed, a handful of algorithms has been developed using this philosophy, such as DANE [27],
DISCO [38], GIANT [34] , DINGO [7], Newton-MR [26], INEXACT DANE and AIDE [25]. In a
recent work [17], second order optimization and compression schemes are used simultaneously for
communication efficiency. On the other hand, the problem of developing Byzantine-robust distributed
algorithms has also been considered recently (see [29, 13, 6, 36, 37, 15, 4] ). However, all of these
papers analyze different variations of the gradient descent, the standard first order optimization
algorithm.
In this work, we propose COMRADE, a distributed approximate Newton-type algorithm that com-
municates less and is resilient to Byzantine workers. Specifically, we consider a distributed setup
with m worker machines and one center machine. The goal is to minimize a regularized convex loss
f : Rd → R, which is additive over the available data points. Furthermore, we assume that α fraction
of the worker machines are Byzantine, where α ∈ [0, 1/2). We assume that Byzantine workers can
send any arbitrary values to the center machine. In addition, they may completely know the learning
algorithm and are allowed to collude with each other. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
paper that addresses the problem of Byzantine resilience in second order optimization.
In our proposed algorithm, the worker machines communicate only once per iteration with the center
machine. This is in sharp contrast with the state-of-the-art distributed second order algorithms (like
GIANT [34], DINGO [7], Determinantal Averaging [9]), which sequentially estimates functions
of local gradients and Hessians and communicate them with the center machine. In this way, they
end up communicating twice per iteration with the center machine. We show that this sequential
estimation is redundant. Instead, in COMRADE, the worker machines only send a d dimensional
vector, the product of the inverse of local Hessian and the local gradient. Via sketching arguments,
we show that the empirical mean of the product of local Hessian inverse and local gradient is close to
the global Hessian inverse and gradient product, and thus just sending the above-mentioned product
is sufficient to ensure convergence. Hence, in this way, we save O(d) bits of communication per
iteration. Furthermore, in Section 5, we argue that, in order to cut down further communication, the
worker machines can even compress the local Hessian inverse and gradient product. Specifically, we
use a (generic) ρ-approximate compressor ([19]) for this, that encompasses sign-based compressors
like QSGD [1] and topk sparsification [28].
For Byzantine resilience, COMRADE employs a simple thresholding policy on the norms of the local
Hessian inverse and local gradient product. Note that norm-based thresholding is computationally
much simpler in comparison to existing co-ordinate wise median or trimmed mean ([36]) algorithms.
Since the norm of the Hessian-inverse and gradient product determines the amount of movement for
Newton-type algorithms, this norm corresponds to a natural metric for identifying and filtering out
Byzantine workers.
Our Contributions: We propose a communication efficient Newton-type algorithm that is robust
to Byzantine worker machines. Our proposed algorithm, COMRADE takes as input the local Hessian
inverse and gradient product (or a compressed version of it) from the worker machines, and performs
a simple thresholding operation on the norm of the said vector to discard β > α fraction of workers
having largest norm values. We prove the linear-quadratic rate of convergence of our proposed
algorithm for strongly convex loss functions. In particular, suppose there are m worker machines,
each containing s data points; and let ∆t = wt −w∗, where wt is the t-th iterate of COMRADE,
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and w∗ is the optimal model we want to estimate. In Theorem 2, we show that
‖∆t+1‖ ≤ max{Ψ(1)t ‖∆t‖,Ψ(2)t ‖∆t‖2}+ (Ψ(3)t + α)
√
1
s
,
where {Ψ(i)t }3i=1 are quantities dependent on several problem parameters. Notice that the above
implies a quadratic rate of convergence when ‖∆t‖ ≥ Ψ(1)t /Ψ(2)t . Subsequently, when ‖∆t‖
becomes sufficiently small, the above condition is violated and the convergence slows down to a
linear rate. The error-floor, which is O(1/√s) comes from the Byzantine resilience subroutine in
conjunction with the simultaneous estimation of Hessian and gradient. Furthermore, in Section 5,
we consider worker machines compressing the local Hessian inverse and gradient product via a ρ-
approximate compressor [19], and show that the (order-wise) rate of convergence remain unchanged,
and the compression factor, ρ affects the constants only.
We experimentally validate our proposed algorithm, COMRADE, with several benchmark data-sets.
We consider several types of Byzantine attacks and observe that COMRADE is robust against
Byzantine worker machines, yielding better classification accuracy compared to the existing state-of-
the-art second order algorithms.
A major technical challenge of this paper is to approximate local gradient and Hessian simultaneously
in the presence of Byzantine workers. We use sketching, similar to [34], along with the norm based
Byzantine resilience technique. Using incoherence (defined shortly) of the local Hessian along with
concentration results originating from uniform sampling, we obtain the simultaneous gradient and
Hessian approximation. Furthermore, ensuring at least one non-Byzantine machine gets trimmed at
every iteration of COMRADE, we control the influence of Byzantine workers.
Related Work: Second order Optimization: Second order optimization has received a lot of
attention in the recent years in the distributed setting owing to its attractive convergence speed.
The fundamentals of second order optimization is laid out in [27], and an extension with better
convergence rates is presented in [25]. Recently, in GIANT [34] algorithm, each worker machine
computes an approximate Newton direction in each iteration and the center machine averages them
to obtain a globally improved approximate Newton direction. Furthermore, DINGO [7] generalizes
second order optimization beyond convex functions by extending the Newton-MR [26] algorithm in
a distributed setting. Very recently, [9] proposes Determinantal averaging to correct the inversion
bias of the second order optimization. A slightly different line of work ([33], [18], [24]) uses Hessian
sketching to solve a large-scale distributed learning problems.
Byzantine Robust Optimization: In the seminal work of [13], a generic framework of one shot
median based robust learning has been proposed and analyzed in the distributed setting. The issue
of Byzantine failure is tackled by grouping the servers in batches and computing the median of
batched servers in [6] (the median of means algorithm). Later in [36, 37], co-ordinate wise median,
trimmed mean and iterative filtering based algorithm have been proposed and optimal statistical error
rate is obtained. Also, [23, 8] consider adversaries may steer convergence to bad local minimizers
for non-convex optimization problems. Byzantine resilience with gradient quantization has been
addressed in the recent works of [3, 16].
Organization: In Section 3, we first analyze COMRADE with one round of communication per
iteration. We assume α = 0, and focus on the communication efficiency aspect only. Subsequently,
in Section 4, we make α 6= 0, thereby addressing communication efficiency and Byzantine resilience
simultaneously. Further, in Section 5 we augment a compression scheme along with the setting of
Section 4. Finally, in Section 6, we validate our theoretical findings with experiments. Proofs of all
theoretical results can be found in the supplementary material.
Notation: For a positive integer r, [r] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , r}. For a vector v, we use ‖v‖ to
denote the `2 norm unless otherwise specified. For a matrix X , we denote ‖X‖2 denotes the operator
norm, σmax(X) and σmin(X) denote the maximum and minimum singular value. Throughout the
paper, we use C,C1, c, c1 to denote positive universal constants, whose value changes with instances.
3
2 Problem Formulation
We begin with the standard statistical learning framework for empirical risk minimization, where the
objective is to minimize the following loss function:
f(w) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
`j(w
Txj) +
λ
2
‖w‖2, (1)
where, the loss functions `j : R→ R, j ∈ [n] are convex, twice differentiable and smooth. Moreover,
x1,x2, . . . ,xn ∈ Rd denote the input feature vectors and y1, y2, . . . , yn ∈ R denote the correspond-
ing responses. Furthermore, we assume that the function f is strongly convex, implying the existence
of a unique minimizer of (1). We denote this minimizer by w∗. Note that the response {yj}nj=1 is
captured by the corresponding loss function {`j}nj=1. Some examples of `j are
logistic loss: `j(zj) = log(1− exp(−zjyj)), squared loss: `j(zj) = 1
2
(zj − yj)2
We consider the framework of distributed optimization with m worker machines, where the feature
vectors and the loss functions (x1, `1), . . . , (xn, `n) are partitioned homogeneously among them.
Furthermore, we assume that α fraction of the worker machines are Byzantine for some α < 12 . The
Byzantine machines, by nature, may send any arbitrary values to the center machine. Moreover,
they can even collude with each other and plan malicious attacks with complete information of the
learning algorithm.
3 COMRADE Can Communicate Less
We first present the Newton-type learning algorithm, namely COMRADE without any Byzantine
workers, i.e., α = 0. It is formally given in Algorithm 1 (with β = 0). In each iteration of our
algorithm, every worker machine computes the local Hessian and local gradient and sends the local
second order update (which is the product of the inverse of the local Hessian and local gradient) to the
center machine. The center machine aggregates the updates from the worker machines by averaging
them and updates the model parameter w. Later the center machine broadcast the parameter w to all
the worker machines.
In any iteration t, a standard Newton algorithm requires the computation of exact Hessian (Ht) and
gradient (gt) of the loss function which can be written as
gt =
1
n
n∑
i=1
`′j(w
>
t xi)xi + λwt, Ht =
1
n
n∑
i=1
`
′′
j (w
>
t xi)xix
>
i + λI. (2)
In a distributed set up, the exact Hessian (Ht) and gradient (gt) can be computed in parallel in the
following manner. In each iteration, the center machine ‘broadcasts’ the model parameter wt to the
worker machines and each worker machine computes its own local gradient and Hessian. Then the
center machine can compute the exact gradient and exact Hessian by averaging the the local gradient
vectors and local Hessian matrices. But for each worker machine the per iteration communication
complexity is O(d) for the gradient computation and O(d2) for the Hessian computation. Using
Algorithm 1, we reduce the communication cost to only O(d) per iteration, which is the same as the
first order methods.
Each worker machine possess s samples drawn uniformly from {(x1, `1), (x2, `2), . . . , (xn, `n)}.
By Si, we denote the indices of the samples held by worker machine i. At any iteration t, the worker
machine computes the local Hessian Hi,t and local gradient gi,t as
gi,t =
1
s
∑
i∈Si
`′j(w
>
t xi)xi + λwt, Hi,t =
1
s
∑
i∈Si
`
′′
j (w
>
t xi)xix
>
i + λI. (3)
It is evident from the uniform sampling that E[gi,t] = gt and E[Hi,t] = Ht. The update direction
from the worker machine is defined as pˆi,t = (Hi,t)−1gi,t. Each worker machine requires O(sd2)
operations to compute the Hessian matrix Hi,t and O(d3) operations to invert the matrix. In practice,
the computational cost can be reduced by employing conjugate gradient method. The center machine
computes the parameter update direction pˆt = 1m
∑m
i=1 pˆi,t.
We show that given large enough sample in each worker machine (s is large) and with incoherent data
points (the information is spread out and not concentrated to a small number of sample data points),
the local Hessian Hi,t is close to the global Hessian Ht in spectral norm, and the local gradient gi,t
is close to the global gradient gt. Subsequently, we prove that the empirical average of the local
updates acts as a good proxy for the global Newton update and achieves good convergence guarantee.
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Algorithm 1 COMmunication-efficient and Robust Approximate Distributed nEwton (COMRADE)
1: Input: Step size γ, parameter β ≥ 0
2: Initialize: Initial iterate w0 ∈ Rd
3: for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 do
4: Central machine: broadcasts wt
for i ∈ [m] do in parallel
5: i-th worker machine:
• Non-Byzantine: Computes local gradient gi,t and local Hessian Hi,t; sends pˆi,t =
(Hi,t)
−1gi,t to the central machine,
• Byzantine: Generates ? (arbitrary), and sends it to the center machine
end for
6: Center Machine:
• Sort the worker machines in a non decreasing order according to norm of updates
{pˆi,t}mi=1 from the local machines
• Return the indices of the first 1− β fraction of machines as Ut,
• Approximate Newton Update direction : pˆt = 1|Ut|
∑
i∈Ut pˆi,t
• Update model parameter: wt+1 = wt − γpˆt.
7: end for
3.1 Theoretical Guarantee
We define the matrix A>t = [a
>
1 , . . . ,a
>
n ] ∈ Rd×n where aj =
√
`′′j (w>xj) xj . So the exact
Hessian in equation (2) is Ht = 1nA
>
t At + λI. Also we define Bt = [b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Rd×n where
bi = `
′
i(w
Txi)xi. So the exact gradient in equation (2) is gt = 1nBt1 + λwt
Definition 1 (Coherence of a Matrix). Let A ∈ Rn×d be any matrix with U ∈ Rn×d being its
orthonormal basis (the left singular vectors). The row coherence of the matrix A is defined as
µ(A) = nd maxi ‖ui‖2 ∈
[
1, nd
]
, where ui is the ith row of U.
Remark 1. If the coherence of At is small, it can be shown that the Hessian matrix can be approxi-
mated well via selecting a subset of rows. Note that this is a fairly common to use coherence condition
as an approximation tool (see [11, 12, 22])
In the following, we assume that the Hessian matrix is L-Lipschitz (see definition below), which is a
standard assumption for the analysis of the second order method for general smooth loss function (as
seen in [34],[9]).
Assumption 1. The Hessian matrix of the loss function f is L-Lipschitz continuous i.e.∥∥∇2f(w)−∇2f(w′)∥∥
2
≤ L ‖w − w′‖.
In the following theorem, we provide the convergence rate of COMRADE (with α = β = 0) in the
terms of ∆t = wt −w∗. Also, we define κt = σmax(Ht)/σmin(Ht) as the condition number of
Ht, and hence κt ≥ 1.
Theorem 1. Let µ ∈ [1, nd ] be the coherence of At . Suppose γ = 1 and s ≥ 3µdη2 log mdδ for some
η, δ ∈ (0, 1). Under Assumption 1 , with probability exceeding 1− δ, we obtain
‖∆t+1‖ ≤ max{
√
κt(
ζ2
1− ζ2 )‖∆t‖,
L
σmin(Ht)
‖∆t‖2}+ 2√
σmin(Ht)
,
where ζ = ν( η√
m
+ η
2
1−η ), ν =
σmax(A
>A)
σmax(A>A)+nλ
≤ 1, and
 =
1
1− η
1√
σmin(Ht)
(1 +
√
2 ln(
m
δ
))
√
1
s
max
i
‖bi‖. (4)
Remark 2. It is well known that a distributed Newton method has linear-quadratic convergence rate.
In Theorem 1 the quadratic term comes from the standard analysis of Newton method. The linear
term (which is small) arises owing to Hessian approximation. It gets smaller with better Hessian
approximation (smaller η), and thus the above rate becomes quadratic one. The small error floor
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arises due to the gradient approximation in the worker machines, which is essential for the one round
of communication per iteration. The error floor is ∝ 1√
s
where s is the number of samples in each
worker machine. So for a sufficiently large s, the error floor becomes negligible.
Remark 3. The sample size in each worker machine is dependent on the coherence of the matrix
At and the dimension d of the problem. Theoretically, the analysis is feasible for the case of s ≥ d
(since we work with H−1i,t ). However, when s < d, one can replace the inverse by a pseudo-inverse
(modulo some changes in convergence rate).
4 COMRADE Can Resist Byzantine Workers
In this section, we analyze COMRADE with Byzantine workers. We assume that α(< 1/2) fraction
of worker machines are Byzantine. We define the set of Byzantine worker machines by B and the set
of the good (non-Byzantine) machines byM. COMRADE employs a ‘norm based thresholding’
scheme on the local Hessian inverse and gradient product to tackle the Byzantine workers.
In the t-th iteration, the center machine outputs a set Ut with |Ut| = (1− β)m, consisting the indices
of the worker machines with smallest norm. Hence, we ‘trim’ the worker machines that may try
to diverge the learning algorithm. We denote the set of trimmed machines as Tt. Moreover, we
take β > α to ensure at least one good machine falls in Tt. This condition helps us to control the
Byzantine worker machines. Finally, the update is given by pˆt = 1|Ut|
∑
i∈Ut pˆi,t. We define:
2byz = [3(
1− α
1− β )
2 + 4κt(
α
1− β )
2]2, (5)
ζ2byz = 2(
1− α
1− β )
2(
ν
1− η )
2 + ν2(
1− α
1− β )
2(
η√
(1− α)m +
η2
1− η )
2 + 4κt(
α
1− β )
2[2 + (
ν
1− η )
2]. (6)
 is defined in (4), ν = σmax(A
TA)
σmax(ATA)+nλ
and κt is the condition number of the exact Hessian Ht.
Theorem 2. Let µ ∈ [1, nd ] be the coherence of At . Suppose γ = 1 and s ≥ 3µdη2 log mdδ for some
η, δ ∈ (0, 1). For 0 ≤ α < β < 1/2 , under Assumption 1 , with probability exceeding 1 − δ,
Algorithm 1 yields
‖∆t+1‖ ≤ max{
√
κt(
ζ2byz
1− ζ2byz
)‖∆t‖, L
σmin(Ht)
‖∆t‖2}+ 2byz√
σmin(Ht)
,
where ζbyz and byz are defined in equations (5) and (6) respectively.
The remarks of Section 3 is also applicable here. On top of that, we have the following remarks:
Remark 4. Compared to the convergence rate of Theorem 1, the rate here remains order-wise same
even with Byzantine robustness. The coefficient of the quadratic term remains unchanged but the
linear rate and the error floor suffers a little bit (by a small constant factor).
Remark 5. Note that for Theorem 2 to hold, we require α ∼ 1/√κt for all t. In cases where κt is
large, this can impose a stricter condition on α. However, we conjecture that this dependence can
be improved via applying a more intricate (and perhaps computation heavy) Byzantine resilience
algorithm. In this work, we kept the Byzantine resilience scheme simple at the expense of this
condition on α.
5 COMRADE Can Communicate Even Less and Resist Byzantine Workers
In Section 3 we analyze COMRADE with an additional feature. We let the worker machines further
reduce the communication cost by applying a generic class of ρ-approximate compressor [19] on the
parameter update of Algorithm 1. We first define the class of ρ-approximate compressor:
Definition 2. An operator Q : Rd → Rd is defined as ρ-approximate compressor on a set S ⊂ Rd if,
∀x ∈ S, ‖Q(x)− x‖2 ≤ (1− ρ) ‖x‖2, where ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the compression factor.
The above definition can be extended for any randomized operator Q satisfying E(‖Q(x)− x‖2) ≤
(1− ρ) ‖x‖2, for all ∀x ∈ S. The expectation is taken over the randomization of the operator. Notice
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(a) w5a (b) a9a (c) Epsilon (d) covtype
(e) GIANT ‘flipped’ attack (f) GIANT ‘negative’ attack (g) Robust GIANT (h) Robust GIANT
Figure 1: (First row) Comparison of training accuracy between COMRADE(Algorithm 1) and
GIANT [34] with (a) w5a (b) a9a (c) Epsilon (d) Covtype dataset. (Second row) Training accuracy of
(e) GIANT for ‘flipped label’ and (f) ‘negative update’ attack; and comparison of Robust GIANT and
COMRADE with a9a dataset for (g) ‘flipped label’ and (h) ‘negative update’ attack.
that ρ = 1 implies that Q(x) = x (no compression). Examples of ρ-approximate compressor include
QSGD [1], `1-QSGD [19], topk sparsification and randk [28].
Worker machine i computes the product of local Hessian inverse inverse and local gradient and then
apply ρ-approximate compressor to obtain Q(H−1i,t gi,t); and finally sends this compressed vector
to the center. The Byzantine resilience subroutine remains the same–except, instead of sorting with
respect to ‖H−1i,t gi,t‖, the center machine now sorts according to ‖Q(H−1i,t gi,t)‖. The center machine
aggregates the compressed updates by averaging Q(pˆ) = 1|Ut|
∑
i∈Ut Q(pˆi,t), and take the next step
as wt+1 = wt − γQ(pˆ).
Recall the definition of  from (4). We also use the following notation : ζ2M = ν(
η√
(1−α)m +
η2
1−η ), ζ1 =
ν
1−η and ν =
σmax(A
TA)
σmax(ATA)+nλ
. Furthermore, we define the following:
2comp,byz = [3(
1− α
1− β )
2 + 4κt(
α
1− β )
2](1 + κ(1− ρ))2 (7)
ζ2comp,byz = 2(
1− α
1− β )
2(ζ21 + κt(1− ρ)((1 + ζ21 )) + (1− α
1− β )
2(ζ2M + κt(1− ρ)((1 + ζ21 ))
+ 4κt(
α
1− β )
2(2 + (ζ21 + κt(1− ρ)((1 + ζ21 ))) (8)
Theorem 3. Let µ ∈ [1, nd ] be the coherence of At . Let γ = 1 and s ≥ 3µdη2 log mdδ for some
η, δ ∈ (0, 1). For 0 ≤ α < β < 1/2, under Assumption 1 and with Q being the ρ-approximate
compressor, with probability exceeding 1− δ, we obtain
‖∆t+1‖ ≤ max{
√
κt(
ζ2comp,byz
1− ζ2comp,byz
)‖∆t‖, L
σmin(Ht)
‖∆t‖2}+ comp,byz√
σmin(Ht)
where comp,byz and ζcomp,byz are given in equations (7) and (8) respectively.
Remark 6. With no compression (ρ = 1) we get back the convergence guarantee of Theorem 2.
Remark 7. Note that even with compression, we retain the linear-quadratic rate of convergence of
COMRADE. The constants are affected by a ρ-dependent term.
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6 Experimental Results
In this section we validate our algorithm, COMRADE in Byzantine and non-Byzantine setup
on synthetically generated and benchmark LIBSVM [5] data-set. The experiments focus
on the standard logistic regression problem. The logistic regression objective is defined as
1
n
∑n
i=1 log
(
1 + exp(−yix>i w)
)
+ λ2n‖w‖2, where w ∈ Rd is the parameter, {xi}ni=1 ∈ Rd
are the feature data and {yi}ni=1 ∈ {0, 1} are the corresponding labels. We use ‘mpi4py’ package in
distributed computing framework (swarm2) at the University of Massachusetts Amherst [31]. We
choose ‘a9a’ (d = 123, n ≈ 32K), ‘w5a’ (d = 300, n ≈ 10k), ‘Epsilon’ (d = 2000, n = 0.4M) and
‘covtype.binary’ (d = 54, n ≈ 0.5M) classification datasets and partition the data in 20 different
worker machines. In the experiments, we choose two types of Byzantine attacks : (1). ‘flipped
label’-attack where (for binary classification) the Byzantine worker machines flip the labels of the
data, thus making the model learn with wrong labels, and (2). ‘negative update attack’ where the
Byzantine worker machines compute the local update (pˆi) and communicate −c× pˆi with c ∈ (0, 1)
making the updates to be opposite of actual direction. We choose β = α+ 2m .
(a) w5a (b) a9a (c) Epsilon (d) covtype
(e) w5a (f) a9a (g) Epsilon (h) covtype
(i) w5a ‘flipped’ (j) w5q ‘negative’ (k) a9a ‘flipped’ (l) a9a ‘negative’
Figure 2: (First row) Accuracy of COMRADE with 10%, 15%, 20% Byzantine workers with ‘nega-
tive update’ attack for (a). w5a (b). a9a (c). covtype (d). Epsilon. (Second row) COMRADE accuracy
with 10%, 15%, 20% Byzantine workers with ‘flipped label’ attack for (e) w5a (f) a9a (g) covtype
(h) Epsilon. (Third row) Accuracy of COMRADE with ρ-approximate compressor (Section 5) with
10%, 15%, 20% Byzantine workers; (i) ‘flipped label’ attack for w5a (j) ‘negative update’ attack for
w5a. (k) ‘flipped label’ attack for a9a . (l) ‘negative update’ attack for a9a dataset.
In Figure 1(first row) we compare COMRADE in non-Byzantine setup (α = β = 0) with the state-of
the art algorithm GIANT [34]. It is evident from the plot that despite the fact that COMRADE
requires less communication, the algorithm is able to achieve similar accuracy. Also, we show the
ineffectiveness of GIANT in the presence of Byzantine attacks. In Figure 2((e),(f)) we show the
accuracy for flipped label and negative update attacks. These plots are an indicator of the requirement
of robustness in the learning algorithm. So we device ‘Robust GIANT’, which is GIANT algorithm
with added ‘norm based thresholding’ for robustness. In particular, we trim the worker machines
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based on the local gradient norm in the first round of communication of GIANT. Subsequently, in the
second round of communication, the non-trimmed worker machines send the updates (product of
local Hessian inverse and the local gradient) to the center machine. We compare COMRADE with
‘Robust GIANT’ in Figure 1((g),(h)) with 10% Byzantine worker machines for ‘a9a’ dataset. It is
evident plot that COMRADE performs better than the ‘Robust GIANT’.
Next we show the accuracy of COMRADE with different numbers of Byzantine worker machines.
Here we choose c = 0.9. We show the accuracy for ’negetive update ’ attack in Figure 2(first row)
and ’flipped label’ attack in Figure 2 (second row). Furthermore, we show that COMRADE works
even when ρ-approximate compressor is applied to the updates. In Figure 2(Third row) we plot the
tranning accuracies. For compression we apply the scheme known as QSGD [1]. Further experiments
can be found in the supplementary material.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we address the issue of communication efficiency and Byzantine robustness via second
order optimization and norm based thresholding respectively for strongly convex loss. Extending our
setting to handle weakly convex and non-convex loss is of immediate interest. We would also like to
exploit local averaging with second order optimization. Moreover, an import aspect, privacy, is not
addressed in this work. We keep this as our future research direction.
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8 Appendix A: Analysis of Section 3
Matrix Sketching
Here we briefly discuss the matrix sketching that is broadly used in the context of randomized
linear algebra. For any matrix A ∈ Rn×d the sketched matrix Z ∈ Rs×d is defined as STA where
S ∈ Rn×s is the sketching matrix (typically s < n). Based on the scope and basis of the application,
the sketched matrix is constructed by taking linear combination of the rows of matrix which is known
as random projection or by sampling and scaling a subset of the rows of the matrix which is known
as random sampling. The sketching is done to get a smaller representation of the original matrix to
reduce computational cost.
Here we consider a uniform row sampling scheme. The matrix Z is formed by sampling and scaling
rows of the matrix A. Each row of the matrix A is sampled with probability p = 1n and scaled by
multiplying with 1√sp .
P
(
zi =
aj√
sp
)
= p,
where zi is the i-th row matrix Z and aj is the j th row of the matrix A. Consequently the sketching
matrix S has one non-zero entry in each column.
We define the matrix A>t = [a
>
1 , . . . ,a
>
n ] ∈ Rd×n where aj =
√
`′′j (w>xj) xj . So the exact
Hessian in equation (2) is Ht = 1nA
>
t At + λI. Assume that Si is the set of features that are held by
the ith worker machine. So the local Hessian is
Hi,t =
1
s
∑
j∈Si
`′′j (w
>xj)xjx>j + λI =
1
s
A>i,tAi,t + λI,
where Ai,t ∈ Rs×d and the row of the matrix Ai,t is indexed by Si. Also we define Bt =
[b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Rd×n where bi = `′i(w>xi)xi. So the exact gradient in equation (2) is gt =
1
nBt1 + λwt and the local gradient is
gi,t =
1
s
∑
i∈Si
`′j(w
>
t xi)xi + λwt =
1
s
Bi,t1 + λwt,
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where Bi,t is the matrix with column indexed by Si. If {Si}mi=1 are the sketching matrices then the
local Hessian and gradient can be expressed as
Hi,t = A
>
t SiS
>
i A
>
t + λI gi,t =
1
n
BSiS
>
i 1 + λw. (9)
With the help of sketching idea later we show that the local hessian and gradient are close to the exact
hessian and gradient.
The Quadratic function For the purpose of analysis we define an auxiliary quadratic function
φ(p) =
1
2
p>Htp− g>t p =
1
2
p>(A>t At + λI)p− g>t p. (10)
The optimal solution to the above function is
p∗ = arg minφ(p) = H−1t gt = (A
>
t At + λI)
−1gt,
which is also the optimal direction of the global Newton update. In this work we consider the local
and global (approximate ) Newton direction to be
pˆi,t = (A
>SiS>i A + λI)
−1gi,t, pˆt =
1
m
m∑
i=1
pˆi,t.
respectively. And it can be easily verified that each local update pˆi,t is optimal solution to the
following quadratic function
φˆi,t(p) =
1
2
p>(A>SiS>i A + λI)p− g>i p. (11)
In our convergence analysis we show that value of the quadratic function in (10) with value pˆt is
close to the optimal value.
Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) For any matrix A ∈ Rn×d with rank r, the singular value
decomposition is defined as A = UΣV> where U,V are n × r and d × r column orthogonal
matrices respectively and Σ is a r × r diagonal matrix with diagonal entries {σ1, . . . σr}. If A is a
symmetric positive semi-definite matrix then U = V.
8.1 Analysis
Lemma 1 (McDiarmid’s Inequality). Let X = X1, . . . , Xm be m independent random variables
taking values from some set A, and assume that f : Am → R satisfies the following condition
(bounded differences ):
sup
x1,...,xm,xˆi
|f(xi, . . . , xi, . . . , xm)− f(xi, . . . , xˆi, . . . , xm)| ≤ ci,
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Then for any  > 0 we have
P [f(X1, . . . , Xm)− E[f(X1, . . . , Xm)] ≥ ] ≤ exp
(
− 2
2∑m
i=1 c
2
i
)
.
The property described in the following Lemma 2 is a very useful result for uniform row sampling
sketching matrix.
Lemma 2 (Lemma 8 [34]). Let η, δ ∈ (0, 1) be a fixed parameter and r = rank(At) and U ∈
Rn×r be the orthonormal bases of the matrix At. Let {Si}mi=1 be sketching matrices and S =
1√
m
[S1, . . .Sm] ∈ Rn×ms. With probability 1− δ the following holds∥∥U>SiS>i U− I∥∥2 ≤ η ∀i ∈ [m] and ∥∥U>SS>U− I∥∥2 ≤ η√m.
Lemma 3. Let S ∈ Rn×s be any uniform sampling sketching matrix, then for any matrix B =
[b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Rd×n with probability 1− δ for any δ > 0 we have,
‖ 1
n
BSS>1− 1
n
B1‖ ≤ (1 +
√
2 ln(
1
δ
))
√
1
s
max
i
‖bi‖,
where 1 is all ones vector.
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Proof. The vector B1 is the sum of column of the matrix B and BSS>1 is the sum of uniformly
sampled and scaled column of the matrix B where the scaling factor is 1√sp with p =
1
n . If (i1, . . . , is)
is the set of sampled indices then BSS>1 =
∑
k∈(i1,...,is)
1
spbk.
Define the function f(i1, . . . , is) = ‖ 1nBSS>1 − 1nB1‖. Now consider a sampled set
(i1, . . . , ij′ , . . . , is) with only one item (column) replaced then the bounded difference is
∆ = |f(i1, . . . , ij , . . . , is)− f(i1, . . . , ij′ , . . . , is)|
= | 1
n
‖ 1
sp
bi′j −
1
sp
bij‖| ≤
2
s
max
i
‖bi‖.
Now we have the expectation
E[‖ 1
n
BSS>1− 1
n
B1‖2] ≤ n
sn2
n∑
i=1
‖bi‖2 = 1
s
max
i
‖bi‖2
⇒ E[‖ 1
n
BSS>1− 1
n
B1‖] ≤
√
1
s
max
i
‖bi‖.
Using McDiarmid inequality (Lemma 1) we have
P [
∥∥∥∥∥ 1nBSS>1− 1nB1‖ ≥
√
1
s
max
i
‖bi‖+ t
]
≤ exp
(
− 2t
2
s∆2
)
.
Equating the probability with δ we have
exp(− 2t
2
s∆2
) = δ
⇒t = ∆
√
s
2
ln(
1
δ
) = max
i
‖bi‖
√
2
s
ln(
1
δ
).
Finally we have with probability 1− δ
‖ 1
n
BSS>1− 1
n
B1‖ ≤ (1 +
√
2 ln(
1
δ
))
√
1
s
max
i
‖bi‖.
Remark 8. For m sketching matrix {Si}mi=1, the bound in the Lemma 3 is
‖ 1
n
BSiS
>
i 1−
1
n
B1‖ ≤ (1 +
√
2 ln(
m
δ
))
√
1
s
max
i
‖bi‖,
with probability 1− δ for any δ > 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. In the case that each worker machine
holds data based on the uniform sketching matrix the local gradient is close to the exact gradient.
Thus the local second order update acts as a good approximate to the exact Netwon update.
Now we consider the update rule of GIANT [34] where the update is done in two rounds in each
iteration. In the first round each worker machine computes and send the local gradient and the
center machine computes the exact gradient gt in iteration t. Next the center machine broadcasts
the exact gradient and each worker machine computes the local Hessian and send p˜i,t = (Hi,t)−1gt
to the center machine and the center machine computes the approximate Newton direction p˜t =
1
m
∑m
i=1 p˜i,t. Now based on this we restate the following lemma (Lemma 6 [34]).
Lemma 4. Let {Si}mi=1 ∈ Rn×s be sketching matrices based on Lemma 2. Let φt be defined in (10)
and p˜t be the update. It holds that
min
p
φt(p) ≤ φt(p˜t) ≤ (1− ζ2) min
p
φt(p),
where ζ = ν( η√
m
+ η
2
1−η ) and ν =
σmax(A
>A)
σmax(A>A)+nλ
≤ 1.
Now we prove similar guarantee for the update according to COMRADE in Algorithm 1.
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Lemma 5. Let {Si}mi=1 ∈ Rn×s be sketching matrices based on Lemma 2. Let φt be defined in (10)
and pˆt be defined in Algorithm 1(β = 0)
min
p
φt(p) ≤ φt(pˆt) ≤ 2 + (1− ζ2) min
p
φt(p),
where  = 11−η
1√
σmin(Ht)
(1 +
√
2 ln(mδ ))
√
1
s maxi ‖bi‖ and ζ = ν( η√m + η
2
1−η ) and ν =
σmax(A
>A)
σmax(A>A)+nλ
.
Proof. First consider the quadratic function (10)
φt(pˆt)− φt(p∗) = 1
2
‖H 12t (pˆt − p∗)‖2
≤ (‖H 12t (pˆt − p˜t)‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term1
+ ‖H 12t (p˜t − p∗)‖)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term2
, (12)
where p˜t = 1m
∑m
i=1(Hi,t)
−1gt. First we bound the Term 2 of (12) using the quadratic function and
Lemma 4
1
2
∥∥∥H 12t (p˜t − p∗)∥∥∥)2 ≤ ζ2 ∥∥∥H 12t p∗∥∥∥2 (Using Lemma 4 )
= −ζ2φt(p∗). (13)
The step in equation (13) is from the definition of the function φt and p∗. It can be shown that
φt(p
∗) = −
∥∥∥H 12t p∗∥∥∥2 .
Now we bound the Term 1 in (12). By Lemma 2, we have (1 − η)A>t At  A>t SiS>i At 
(1 + η)A>t At. Following we have (1 − η)Ht  Hi,t  (1 + η)Ht. Thus there exists matrix ξi
satisfying
H
1
2
t H
−1
i,t H
1
2
t = I + ξi and −
η
1 + η
 ξi  η
1− η ,
So we have, ∥∥∥H 12t H−1i,t H 12t ∥∥∥ ≤ 1 + η1− η = 11− η . (14)
Now we have ∥∥∥H 12t (pˆt − p˜t)∥∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥∥H 12t 1m
m∑
i=1
(pˆi,t − p˜i,t)
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
m
m∑
i=1
∥∥∥H 12t (pˆi,t − p˜i,t)∥∥∥
=
1
m
m∑
i=1
∥∥∥H 12t H−1i,t (gi,t − gt)∥∥∥
=
1
m
m∑
i=1
∥∥∥H 12t H−1i,t H 12t H− 12t (gi,t − gt)∥∥∥
≤ 1
m
m∑
i=1
∥∥∥H 12t H−1i,t H 12t ∥∥∥∥∥∥H− 12t (gi,t − gt)∥∥∥
≤ 1
1− η
1
m
m∑
i=1
∥∥∥H− 12t (gi,t − gt)∥∥∥ ( Using (14))
≤ 1
1− η
1√
σmin(Ht)
1
m
m∑
i=1
‖(gi,t − gt)‖ . (15)
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Now we bound ‖(gi,t − gt)‖ using Lemma 3,
‖(gi,t − gt)‖ = ‖ 1
n
BSS>1− 1
n
B1‖ ≤ (1 +
√
2 ln(
m
δ
))
√
1
s
max
i
‖bi‖.
Plugging it into equation (15) we get,∥∥∥H 12t (pˆt − p˜t)∥∥∥ ≤ 11− η 1√σmin(Ht) 1m
m∑
i=1
‖(gi,t − gt)‖
≤ 1
1− η
1√
σmin(Ht)
(1 +
√
2 ln(
m
δ
))
√
1
s
max
i
‖bi‖. (16)
Now collecting the terms of (16) and (13) and plugging them into (12) we have
φt(pˆt)− φt(p∗) ≤ 2 − ζ2φt(p∗)
⇒ φt(pˆt) ≤ 2 + (1− ζ2)φt(p∗),
where  is as defined in (4).
Lemma 6. Let ζ ∈ (0, 1),  be any fixed parameter. And pˆt satisfies φt(pˆt) ≤ 2 + (1 −
ζ2) minp φt(p). Under the Assumption 1(Hessian L-Lipschitz) and ∆t = wt −w∗ satisfies
∆>t+1Ht∆t+1 ≤ L‖∆t+1‖‖∆t‖2 +
ζ2
1− ζ2∆
>
t Ht∆t + 2
2.
Proof. We have wt+1 = wt−pˆt,∆t = wt−w∗ and ∆t+1 = wt+1−w∗. Also pˆt = wt−wt+1 =
∆t −∆t+1. From the definition of φ we have,
φt(pˆt) =
1
2
(∆t −∆t+1)>Ht(∆t −∆t+1)− (∆t −∆t+1)) gt,
(1− ζ2)φt( 1
(1− ζ2)∆t) =
1
2(1− ζ2)∆
>
t Ht∆t −∆>t gt.
From the above two equation we have
φt(pˆt)− (1− ζ2)φt( 1
(1− ζ2)∆t)
=
1
2
∆>t+1Ht∆t+1 −
1
2
∆>t Ht∆t+1 +
1
2
∆>t+1gt −
ζ2
2(1− ζ2)∆
>
t Ht∆t.
From Lemma 5 the following holds
φt(pˆt) ≤ 2 + (1− ζ2) min
p
φt(p)
≤ 2 + (1− ζ2)φt( 1
(1− ζ2)∆t).
So we have
1
2
∆>t+1Ht∆t+1 −∆>t Ht∆t+1 + ∆>t+1gt −
ζ2
2(1− ζ2)∆
>
t Ht∆t ≤ 2. (17)
Consider gt = g(wt)
g(wt) = g(w
∗) +
(∫ 1
0
∇2f(w∗ + z(wt −w∗))dz
)
(wt −w∗)
=
(∫ 1
0
∇2f(w∗ + z(wt −w∗))dz
)
∆t (as g(w∗) = 0).
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Now we bound the following
‖Ht∆t − g(wt)‖ ≤ ‖∆t‖
∥∥∥∥∫ 1
0
[∇2f(wt)−∇2f(w∗ + z(wt −w∗))]dz
∥∥∥∥
≤ ‖∆t‖
∫ 1
0
∥∥[∇2f(wt)−∇2f(w∗ + z(wt −w∗))]∥∥ dz (By Jensen’s Inequality)
≤ ‖∆t‖
∫ 1
0
(1− z)L ‖wt −w∗‖ dz (by L-Lipschitz assumption)
=
L
2
‖∆t‖2 .
Plugging it into (17) we have
∆>t+1Ht∆t+1 ≤ 2∆>t+1 (Ht∆t − gt) +
ζ2
(1− ζ2)∆
>
t Ht∆t + 2
2
≤ 2 ‖∆t+1‖ ‖Ht∆t − gt‖+ ζ
2
(1− ζ2)∆
>
t Ht∆t + 2
2
≤ L ‖∆t+1‖ ‖∆t‖2 + ζ
2
(1− ζ2)∆
>
t Ht∆t + 2
2.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. From the Lemma 6 with probability 1− δ
∆>t+1Ht∆t+1 ≤ L ‖∆t+1‖ ‖∆t‖2 +
ζ2
(1− ζ2)∆
>
t Ht∆t + 2
2
≤ L‖∆t+1‖‖∆t‖2 + ( ζ
2
1− ζ2σmax(Ht))‖∆t‖
2 + 22.
So we have,
‖∆t+1‖ ≤ max{
√
σmax(Ht)
σmin(Ht)
(
ζ2
1− ζ2 )‖∆t‖,
L
σmin(Ht)
‖∆t‖2}+ 2√
σmin(Ht)
.
9 Appendix B: Analysis of Section 4
In this section we provide the theoretical analysis of the Byzantine robust method explained in
Section 4 and prove the statistical guarantee. In any iteration t the following holds
|Ut| = |(Ut ∩Mt)|+ |(Ut ∩ Bt)|
|Mt| = |(Ut ∩Mt)|+ |(Mt ∩ Tt)|.
Combining both we have
|Ut| = |Mt| − |(Mt ∩ Tt)|+ |(Ut ∩ Bt)|.
Lemma 7. Let {Si}mi=1 ∈ Rn×s be sketching matrices based on Lemma 2. Let φt be defined in (10)
and pˆt be defined in Algorithm 1. It holds that
min
p
φt(p) ≤ φt(pˆt) ≤ 2byz + (1− ζ2byz)φ(p∗),
where byz and ζbyz is defined in (5) and (6) respectively.
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Proof. In the following analysis we omit the subscript ’t’. From the definition of the quadratic
function (10) we know that
φ(pˆ)− φ(p∗) = 1
2
‖H 12 (pˆ− p∗)‖2.
Now we consider
1
2
‖H 12 (pˆ− p∗)‖2 = 1
2
‖H 12 ( 1|U|
∑
i∈U
pˆi − p∗)‖2
=
1
2
‖H 12 1|U| (
∑
i∈M
(pˆi − p∗)−
∑
i∈(M∩T )
(pˆi − p∗) +
∑
i∈(U∩B)
(pˆi − p∗))‖2
≤ ‖H 12 1|U| (
∑
i∈M
(pˆi − p∗)‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term1
+ 2‖H 12 1|U|
∑
i∈(M∩T )
(pˆi − p∗)‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term2
+ 2‖H 12 1|U|
∑
i∈(U∩B)
(pˆi − p∗))‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term3
.
Now we bound each term separately and use the result of the Lemma 5 to bound each term.
Term1 = ‖H 12 1|U| (
∑
i∈M
(pˆi − p∗)‖2
= (
1− α
1− β )
2‖H 12 1|M| (
∑
i∈M
(pˆi − p∗)‖2
≤ (1− α
1− β )
2[2 + ζ2M‖H
1
2 p∗‖2],
where ζM = ν( η√|M| +
η2
1−η ) = ν(
η√
(1−α)m +
η2
1−η ).
Similarly the Term 2 can be bonded as it is a bound on good machines
Term2 = 2‖H 12 1|U|
∑
i∈(M∩T )
(pˆi − p∗)‖2
= 2(
1− α
1− β )
2‖H 12 1|M ∩ T |
∑
i∈(M∩T )
(pˆi − p∗)‖2
≤ 2(1− α
1− β )
2[2 + ζ2M∩T ‖H
1
2 p∗‖2],
where ζM∩T = ν( η√|M∩T | +
η2
1−η ) ≤ ν( η√(1−β)m +
η2
1−η ).
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For the Term 3 we know that β > α so all the untrimmed worker norm is bounded by a good machine
as at least one good machine gets trimmed.
Term3 = 2‖H 12 1|U|
∑
i∈(U∩B)
(pˆi − p∗))‖2
≤ 2σmax(H)( |U ∩ B||U| )
2‖ 1|U ∩ B|
∑
i∈(U∩B)
(pˆi − p∗))‖2
≤ 2σmax(H)( |U ∩ B||U| )
2 1
|U ∩ B|
∑
i∈(U∩B)
‖(pˆi − p∗))‖2
≤ 4σmax(H)( |U ∩ B||U| )
2 1
|U ∩ B|
∑
i∈(U∩B)
(‖pˆi‖2 + ‖p∗‖2)
≤ 4σmax(H)( |U ∩ B||U| )
2 max
i∈M
(‖pˆi‖2 + ‖p∗‖2)
≤ 4σmax(H)( |U ∩ B||U| )
2 max
i∈M
(‖pˆi − p∗‖2 + 2‖p∗‖2)
≤ 4κ( |U ∩ B||U| )
2 max
i∈M
(‖H 12 (pˆi − p∗)‖2 + 2‖H 12 p∗‖2)
≤ 4κ( |U ∩ B||U| )
2(2 + (2 + ζ21 )‖H
1
2 p∗‖2)
≤ 4κ( α
1− β )
2(2 + (2 + ζ21 )‖H
1
2 p∗‖2),
where ζ1 = ν(η + η
2
1−η ) =
ν
1−η and κ =
σmax(H)
σmin(H)
.
Combining all the bounds on Term1 , Term2 and Term3 we have
1
2
‖H 12 (pˆ− p∗)‖2 ≤ 2byz + ζ2byz‖H
1
2 p∗‖2,
where
2byz =
(
3
(
1− α
1− β
)2
+ 4κ
(
α
1− β
)2)
2,
ζ2byz = 2
(
1− α
1− β
)2
ζ2M∩T +
(
1− α
1− β
)2
ζ2M + 4κ
(
α
1− β
)2
(2 + ζ21 ).
Finally we have
φ(pˆ)− φ(p∗) ≤ 2byz − ζ2byzφ(p∗)
⇒ φ(pˆ) ≤ 2byz + (1− ζ2byz)φ(p∗).
Lemma 8. Let ζbyz ∈ (0, 1), byz be any fixed parameter. And pˆt satisfies φt(pˆt) ≤ 2byz + (1 −
ζ2byz) minp φt(p). Under the Assumption 1(Hessian L-Lipschitz) and ∆t = wt −w∗ satisfies
∆Tt+1Ht∆t+1 ≤ L‖∆t+1‖‖∆t‖2 +
ζ2byz
1− ζ2byz
∆Tt Ht∆t + 2
2
byz.
Proof. We choose ζ = ζbyz and  = byz from the Lemma 7 and follow the proof of Lemma 6 to
obtain the desired bound.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We get the desired bound by developing from the result of the Lemma 8 and following the
proof of Theorem 1
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10 Appendix C:Analysis of Section 5
First we prove the following lemma that will be useful in our subsequent calculations. Consider
that Q(pˆ) = 1|B|
∑
i∈B Q(pˆi). And also we use the following notation ζB = ν( η√|B| +
η2
1−η ),
ν = σmax(A
>A)
σmax(A>A)+nλ
≤ 1.
Lemma 9. If Q(pˆi) is the local update direction and p∗ is the optimal solution to the quadratic
function φ then∥∥∥H 12 (Q(pˆi)− p∗)∥∥∥2 ≤ 1 + κ(1− ρ))2 + (ζ2B + κ(1− ρ)((1 + ζ21 ))∥∥∥H 12 p∗∥∥∥2 ,
where H is the exact Hessian and
1 =
√
(1 + κ(1− ρ)),
ζ2comp,B = (ζ
2
B + κ(1− ρ)((1 + ζ21 )).
 is defined in equation (4) and
Proof. ∥∥∥H 12 (Q(pˆ)− p∗)∥∥∥2 = ∥∥∥H 12 (Q(pˆ)− pˆ + pˆ− p∗)∥∥∥2
≤ 2
∥∥∥H 12 (Q(pˆ)− pˆ)∥∥∥2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term1
+
∥∥∥H 12 (pˆ− p∗)∥∥∥2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term2
 . (18)
Following the proof of Lemma 5 we get∥∥∥H 12 (pˆi − p∗)∥∥∥2 ≤ 2 + ζ1 ∥∥∥H 12 p∗∥∥∥2 , (19)
where  is as defined in (4).Now we consider the term∥∥∥H 12 (Q(pˆi)− pˆi∥∥∥2 ≤ σmax(H)(1− ρ) ‖pˆi‖2
≤ σmax(H)(1− ρ)
(
‖pˆi − p∗‖2 + ‖p∗‖2
)
≤ σmax
σmin
(1− ρ)
(∥∥∥H 12 (pˆi − p∗)∥∥∥2 + ∥∥∥H 12 p∗∥∥∥2)
= κ(1− ρ)
(∥∥∥H 12 (pˆi − p∗)∥∥∥2 + ∥∥∥H 12 p∗∥∥∥2)
≤ κ(1− ρ)
(
2 + (1 + ζ21 )
∥∥∥H 12 p∗∥∥∥2) Using (19).
Now we use the above calculation and bound Term1∥∥∥H 12 (Q(pˆ)− pˆ)∥∥∥2 ≤ 1|B|∑
i∈B
∥∥∥H 12 (Q(pˆi)− pˆi∥∥∥2
≤ κ(1− ρ)
(
2 + (1 + ζ21 )
∥∥∥H 12 p∗∥∥∥2) . (20)
We can bound the Term2 directly using the proof of Lemma 5∥∥∥H 12 (pˆ− p∗)∥∥∥2 ≤ 2 + ζ2B ∥∥∥H 12 p∗∥∥∥2 . (21)
Now we use (20) and (21) and plug them in (18)∥∥∥H 12 (Q(pˆ)− p∗)∥∥∥2 ≤ (1 + κ(1− ρ))2 + (ζ2B + κ(1− ρ)((1 + ζ21 ))∥∥∥H 12 p∗∥∥∥2 .
Now we define
1 =
√
(1 + κ(1− ρ))
ζ2comp,B = (ζ
2
B + κ(1− ρ)((1 + ζ21 )).
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Now we have the robust update in iteration t to be Q(pˆ) = 1|Ut|
∑
i∈Ut Q(pˆi,t).
Lemma 10. Let {Si}mi=1 ∈ Rn×s be sketching matrices based on Lemma 2. Let φt be defined in
(10) and Q(pˆt) be the update with Q being ρ-approximate compressor. It holds that
min
p
φt(p) ≤ φt(Q(pˆt)) ≤ 2comp,byz + (1− ζ2comp,byz)φt(p∗),
where comp,byz and ζ2comp,byz is as defined in (7) and (8) respectively.
Proof. In the following analysis we omit the subscript ’t’. From the definition of the quadratic
function (10) we know that
φ(Q(pˆ))− φ(p∗) = 1
2
‖H 12 (Q(pˆ)− p∗)‖2.
Now we consider
1
2
‖H 12 (Q(pˆ)− p∗)‖2 = 1
2
‖H 12 ( 1|U|
∑
i∈U
Q(pˆi)− p∗)‖2
=
1
2
‖H 12 1|U| (
∑
i∈M
(Q(pˆi)− p∗)−
∑
i∈(M∩T )
(Q(pˆi)− p∗) +
∑
i∈(U∩B)
(Q(pˆi)− p∗))‖2
≤ ‖H 12 1|U| (
∑
i∈M
(Q(pˆi)− p∗)‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term1
+ 2‖H 12 1|U|
∑
i∈(M∩T )
(Q(pˆi)− p∗)‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term2
+ 2‖H 12 1|U|
∑
i∈(U∩B)
(Q(pˆi)− p∗))‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term3
.
Now we bound each term separately and use the Lemma 9
Term1 = ‖H 12 1|U| (
∑
i∈M
(Q(pˆi)− p∗)‖2
= (
1− α
1− β )
2‖H 12 1|M| (
∑
i∈M
(Q(pˆi)− p∗)‖2
≤ (1− α
1− β )
2[21 + ζ
2
comp,M‖H
1
2 p∗‖2],
where ζ2comp,M = (ζ
2
M + κ(1− ρ)((1 + ζ21 ). Similarly the Term 2 can be bonded as it is a bound on
good machines
Term2 = 2‖H 12 1|U|
∑
i∈(M∩T )
(Q(pˆi)− p∗)‖2
= 2(
1− α
1− β )
2‖H 12 1|M ∩ T |
∑
i∈(M∩T )
(Q(pˆi)− p∗)‖2
≤ 2(1− α
1− β )
2[21 + ζ
2
comp,M∩T ‖H
1
2 p∗‖2].
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For the Term 3 we know that β > α so all the untrimmed worker norm is bounded by a good machine
as at least one good machine gets trimmed.
Term3 = 2‖H 12 1|U|
∑
i∈(U∩B)
(Q(pˆi)− p∗))‖2
≤ 2σmax(H)( |U ∩ B||U| )
2‖ 1|U ∩ B|
∑
i∈(U∩B)
(Q(pˆi)− p∗))‖2
≤ 2σmax(H)( |U ∩ B||U| )
2 1
|U ∩ B|
∑
i∈(U∩B)
‖(Q(pˆi)− p∗))‖2
≤ 4σmax(H)( |U ∩ B||U| )
2 1
|U ∩ B|
∑
i∈(U∩B)
(‖Q(pˆi)‖2 + ‖p∗‖2)
≤ 4σmax(H)( |U ∩ B||U| )
2 max
i∈M
(‖Q(pˆi)‖2 + ‖p∗‖2)
≤ 4σmax(H)( |U ∩ B||U| )
2 max
i∈M
(‖Q(pˆi)− p∗‖2 + 2‖p∗‖2)
≤ 4κ( |U ∩ B||U| )
2 max
i∈M
(‖H 12 (Q(pˆi)− p∗)‖2 + 2‖H 12 p∗‖2)
≤ 4κ( |U ∩ B||U| )
2(21 + (2 + ζ
2
1 )‖H
1
2 p∗‖2)
≤ 4κ( α
1− β )
2(21 + (2 + ζ
2
1 )‖H
1
2 p∗‖2).
Combining all the bounds on Term1 , Term2 and Term3 we have
1
2
‖H 12 (pˆ− p∗)‖2 ≤ 2byz + ζ2byz‖H
1
2 p∗‖2,
where
2comp,byz =
(
3
(
1− α
1− β
)2
+ 4κ
(
α
1− β
)2)
21
ζ2comp,byz = 2
(
1− α
1− β
)2
ζ2comp,M∩T +
(
1− α
1− β
)2
ζ2comp,M + 4κ
(
α
1− β
)2
(2 + ζ2comp,1).
Finally we have
φ(pˆ)− φ(p∗) ≤ 2comp,byz − ζ2comp,byzφ(p∗)
⇒ φ(pˆ) ≤ 2comp,byz + (1− ζ2comp,byz)φ(p∗).
Lemma 11. Let ζcomp,byz ∈ (0, 1), comp,byz be any fixed parameter. And Q(pˆt) satisfies
φt(Q(pˆt)) ≤ 2byz + (1 − ζ2byz) minp φt(p). Under the Assumption 1(Hessian L-Lipschitz) and
∆t = wt −w∗ satisfies
∆Tt+1Ht∆t+1 ≤ L‖∆t+1‖‖∆t‖2 +
ζ2comp,byz
1− ζ2comp,byz
∆Tt Ht∆t + 2
2
comp,byz.
Proof. We choose ζ = ζcomp,byz and  = comp,byz from the Lemma 10 and follow the proof of
Lemma 6 to obtain the desired bound.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We get the desired bound by developing from the result of the Lemma 11 and following the
proof of Theorem 1
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11 Additional Experiment
In addition to the experimental results in Section 6, we provide some more experiments supporting
the robustness of the COMRADE in two different types of attacks : 1. ‘Gaussian attack’: where the
Byzantine workers add Gaussian Noise (N (µ, σ2)) to the update and 2. ‘random label attack’: where
the Byzantine worker machines learns based on random labels instead of proper labels.
(a) w5a ‘Gauss’ (b) a9a ‘Gauss’ (c) w5a ‘random’ (d) a9a ‘random’
(e) w5a ‘Gauss’ (f) a9a ‘Gauss’ (g) w5a ‘random’ (h) a9a ‘random’
Figure 3: (First row) Accuracy of COMRADE with 10%, 15%, 20% Byzantine workers with ‘Gaus-
sian ’ attack for (a). w5a (b). a9a and ‘random label’ attack for (c). w5a (d).a9a. (Second row)
Accuracy of COMRADE with ρ-approximate compressor (Section 5) with 10%, 15%, 20% Byzan-
tine workers with ‘Gaussian ’ attack for (a). w5a (b). a9a and ‘random label’ attack for (c). w5a
(d).a9a.
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